Willie – The Man, the Myth and the Era
The Speakership Battles
By
Marcus McGee
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Willie – The Man, The Myth and the Era
The Speakership Battles
Copyright © 1995, 2011 by Marcus McGee
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Willie – The Man, the Myth and the Era
THE 1974 SPEAKERSHIP BATTLE
The black boy can’t count.1
Bob Moretti [after Willie Brown’s defeat in 1974]
For all its drama, the 1974 contest for Assembly speakership was quite possibly at one time the best and worst episode in the political life of Willie Brown. It was a painful loss, but because of it, he learned the importance of numbers.
He was also made to finely-tune the art of deal-making and to understand the consequences of failure. Where some would have accepted the resulting punishments as political death, Willie Brown endured, learned and put himself in place for yet another opportunity, years later.
As the curtain opened for Act I of the two-part drama [see Chapter 21 for Act II], he was young, and to many, brash—not at all the smooth, polished operator many came to perceive him to be in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet he was the brilliant chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, distinguishing himself as an astute legislator with great energy, knowledge and a quick wit. The speakership was a natural end.
When exactly he first seriously entertained the desire to become Assembly speaker is difficult to ascertain, but I did come across two stories having similar elements. The first was told to me by former legislator Mike Cullen, who was Willie Brown’s assembly seat-mate for years.
In an interview, Mr. Cullen related to me that in 1968, as Mr. Brown was deeply enthralled telling one of his famous stories to assemblypersons Knox and Crown, that erstwhile session assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh approached and interrupted, saying, “Willie Brown, it’s a good thing you aren’t white, because if you were, you’d be Speaker!”
Mr. Cullen recalled that he saw the desire in Willie Brown’s eyes at that very moment, relating, “I wouldn’t be surprised if at that very moment Willie Brown said, “Well, by God, Why not?!”2 While the verbiage doesn’t exactly sound like something Willie would say, I’m certain Mr. Cullen summed up the spirit of the moment. The other story is recalled by writer Rian Malan in the April 1982 issue of California magazine:
Toward the end of the sixties, Brown delivered a particularly brilliant speech on the floor, and afterward Speaker Unruh drew him aside. “It’s a good thing you aren’t white,” Unruh rumbled benignly. “Why’s that?” Brown asked. “Because if you were,” Unruh said, “you’d own the place.”
Both stories suggest that circa 1968, four years after Willie Brown was elected to the California State legislature, Speaker Unruh recognized that he had the ability and the disposition to be assembly speaker. Such a compliment from a man as stalwart and respected as Jesse Unruh undoubtedly stirred the thirty-four year-old Willie Brown to aspire for the speakership, if he was not already coveting it.
Mr. Unruh, though, was destined to leave the legislature for the inevitable shootout between him and Ronald Reagan, California’s Governor, in the 1970 state gubernatorial election. The assembly itself, however, after the 1968 presidential election [the narrow victory by Richard Nixon over Hubert Humphrey], became a Republican majority, and the speakership fell to former minority leader, Robert Monagan. Speaker Monagan, with a 41 to 39 Republican advantage in the assembly, was not destined to remain long, so Willie Brown and others were ready when, in 1970, the Democrats regained the advantage with a 43-37 margin.
His first public attempt for the speakership was in 1971, but he lost to Bob Moretti. Some say he failed because, lacking the finesse that later became his trademark, he tried to strong-arm members into voting for him. Speaker Moretti did, however, appoint Mr. Brown as chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee, a committee assigned to handle fiscal concerns, and among those, the State Budget.
Like his Democratic predecessor, though, Mr. Moretti forsook his speakership to run for Governor in 1974. If there was a provision in the assembly for passing the scepter of speakership, it would have passed from Bob Moretti to Willie Brown.
To this end, Speaker Moretti recommended Willie Brown for the job, and Willie Brown initially seemed to be a shoe-in for the position, but as assembly politics go, he would not simply assume the speakership unchallenged. Thus the struggle for leadership began.
THE PLAYERS
The challenger turned out to be another San Francisco Democrat, Leo McCarthy, who had in his political experience learned to be a more efficient operator than Willie Brown. Nowhere was this more obvious than it was in the attitudes of the two aspirants in the year leading up to the Democratic Caucus vote.
Where Willie Brown exuded confidence and levity, Leo McCarthy worked silently behind the scenes, eroding Mr. Brown’s position, playing on concerns members had about him, while constructing a coalition of his own. Where Willie Brown seemed to take the votes of the Black Caucus and Latino Caucus for granted, Leo McCarthy, a conservative Democrat, was meeting with them on a weekly basis to make deals that would secure votes. In the end it proved to be simple math, and Willie Brown lost by four votes in the Democratic Caucus.
In picking off members’ votes, Leo McCarthy employed a strategy that played on the ambition, concerns, prejudices, jealousies, and outside loyalties of the legislative membership. Emphasizing the difference between himself and Willie, he told reporters,
I don’t feel I have to be center stage in everything that goes on in the capitol.3
Recalling the almost militant positions Willie Brown had taken during the sixties, some conservative members were worried that, as Speaker, Mr. Brown would take up some of these “extremely-left” causes at the expense of issues relating to their constituencies.
Others members were concerned that, because of his law practice, he might be spread too thin, that his law concerns might be in conflict with the duty he would have as Speaker, a duty to members. Still others were apprehensive about what they perceived as Willie Brown’s self-absorbed nature: the flamboyance, the clothes, the cars and the glamorous image. And finally, there was just outright prejudice.
The members involved might scoff at hearing it, but there were some who, as liberal as they claimed to be, were just not ready to vote a black man into the Assembly’s top position. Speaker Unruh understood the Assembly’s membership, and he was clearly alluding to members’ racial prejudices and discomfort when he suggested that Willie Brown would be much more successful as a white man.
These are the concerns and prejudices several former members suggested Leo McCarthy played on in order to get the required number of votes that made him Assembly Speaker. When the votes were tallied in the Democratic Caucus, Leo McCarthy counted four more votes than Willie Brown and went before the Assembly on June 27, 1974 with full Democratic Caucus support.
Within the Democratic Caucus, a body of 51 members, there were three voting blocs that figured prominently in the contest between Willie Brown and Leo McCarthy. The first of these was the Black Caucus, with six members: Bill Greene (D-Los Angeles), John J. Miller (D-Oakland), Leon Ralph (D-Los Angeles), Frank Holoman (D-Los Angeles), Julian Dixon (D-Los Angeles), and Willie L. Brown, Jr. (D-San Francisco). According to Lou Cannon of the Washington Post :
Brown sought the Assembly speakership in 1974 and lost, in part because he would not promise a key committee chairmanship to a black legislator whom he considered poorly qualified. Brown’s opponent [McCarthy] made the promise and won.4
When, in late December, Leo McCarthy announced committee chairmanships and assignments, John Miller was named Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Bill Greene was named Chairman of the Labor Relations Committee, Julian Dixon became Chairman of the Public Employees and Retirement Committee, and Leon Ralph was chosen to head the Rules Committee. Frank Holoman had been a part of the speakership vote in June; he had been Brown’s sole supporter in the Black Caucus, but he retired before committees were assigned, and his successor, freshman assemblyman Curtis Tucker (D-Los Angeles) became Vice Chairman of the Elections and Reapportionment Committee.
Given the spirit of the rivalry between the two aspirants and Leo McCarthy’s speakership philosophy, it is not surprising that ten year incumbent Willie Brown was relieved of his chairmanship of the powerful Ways and Means Committee and assigned menial seats on three large committees [Human Resources (nine members), Transportation (fifteen members), and Urban Development and Housing (thirteen members)].
But who was this “black legislator,” at odds with Willie Brown with reference to a “key committee chairmanship” that Leo McCarthy awarded? Of the Chairmanships dispensed to Black Caucus members, the Judiciary Chairmanship and the Rules Chairmanship were the most key, so it might be supposed that the “black legislator” was either John Miller or Leon Ralph. Because the Caucus keeps no public record of individual votes, it had been impossible to substantiate who in the Caucus initially supported and who opposed Willie Brown, but there are many in Sacramento who vividly and specifically remember the dynamics of the time.
In interviews conducted with individuals associated with the 1974 speakership contest, it was generally suggested that this “black legislator” was John Miller, though he did not stand alone against Mr. Brown. During an interview, Alice Huffman, director of the California Teachers’ Association and President of Bay-PAC [Black Political Action Committee], recalled a conversation she had with Bill Green in 1975 after he had become a state senator.
At a reception for Governor Jerry Brown’s black appointees, she asked the senator why he and the other blacks in the assembly hadn’t supported Willie Brown. In Ms. Huffman words:
He unloaded on me. He had me in the corner for one hour telling me all the reasons why, but he was very, very defensive.5
Yet the actual, behind-the-scenes developments suggested far more encompassing dealings involving regional and personal loyalties. According to education lobbyist John Mockler, a former state senator, a former Willie Brown staffer, and a friend to Mr. Brown since 1959,
The speakership fight got involved with gubernatorial politics, it got involved with black, north/south power politics. Remember Merv Dymally was running for lieutenant governor—Merv got involved in this negative thing against Willie—he was worried about too many blacks having power. You know that old game—one’s enough... So Merv weighed in to cut a deal with Leo on money.6
If indeed Mervyn Dymally saw a Willie Brown speakership as a threat to his position as the preeminent black in the state, he sought to derail the astute assemblyman’s bid in a place where he could yield his greatest influence, in the black caucus. His instrument, or agent within that group was a man who hated Willie Brown—John Miller—who would barter opposition to Mr. Brown for a key committee chairmanship. Ironically enough,
John Miller might not have ever been elected to the Assembly if not for Willie Brown, as Mr. Mockler recalled:
It’s interesting that before, John Miller—when he ran for the Assembly in Berkeley, he had a primary opponent named Otho Green—Otho Green was a very strong black man, and we went to Willie and said “you oughta back Otho, he’s a better candidate”. He [Willie Brown] said, “No, no.” Willie went way out. John Miller was nobody, and Willie Brown personally walked precincts, brought people over to get John Miller elected. A few years later...7
A few years later, Mr. Miller, as one capitol observer put it, “was chopping at Willie Brown’s ankles at his every opportunity,”8 and it was Miller who nominated Leo McCarthy for speaker, but John Miller’s opposition and support for Mr. McCarthy apparently did not surprise many. The ill-will John Miller bore for Willie was well documented in several newspapers, including the San Francisco Chronicle, as set forth below,
It’s an open secret in Sacramento that there has been no love lost between Brown and Miller since 1970. In that year, Brown put Miller’s name forward as a compromise candidate for minority leader of the Assembly, when the Democratic caucus couldn’t agree on three announced candidates.9
This incident happened immediately after former speaker Jesse Unruh left the minority leader post to run for Governor against Ronald Reagan. The Republicans held a one-vote edge in the Assembly, where Robert Monagan served as speaker.
The next year, the Democrats became the majority party, and Miller felt that as former minority leader he was entitled to be the Democrat’s choice for speaker. Brown got together a coalition and the Democrats elected Bob Moretti of Van Nuys as their speaker. Miller has never forgotten that. And, in the ways of politics, never forgave Brown10.
Willie acknowledged the personal nature of the rift between himself and John Miller and spoke publicly on the matter, saying,
I don’t know... Miller has had some kind of permanent hate for me ever since then.11
Miller, savoring the opportunity to get a shot at Willie, savoring the opportunity to deny Willie what had been denied him, explained his decision not to support Willie in this way,
Willie is brilliant at public relations, but while he’s talking about what can be done for minorities, we’ve been going around doing the things he’s talking about... The black caucus didn’t leave Willie—he left us.12
In arguing his case before the Black Caucus, Willie urged the five other members,
This [is] the best—maybe the last chance we’ll ever have—to make a minority member speaker of the Assembly... [I have 23 votes.] Look, if you don’t want me, I’ll give my 23 votes to whatever assemblyman you want to name...13
He was in essence prepared to make one of the other members speaker or to cast the Black Caucus as swing votes—votes that could create a speakership—and swing votes could be bartered for power and position. It was no surprise that John Miller resisted, insisting the speaker’s campaign wasn’t a racial thing. What did surprise Willie, however, was the late defection of the other caucus blacks. Pressure brought on by John Miller and Mr. Dymally caused even a close friend to vote against Willie Brown.
For the first time, the personal betrayal of friends, and the kinda realization [of] ethnic-division politics, the jealousy [hurt him]... But Leon Ralph was a Merv Dymally protegee, and Merv pulled the chain. Leon cried when he told Willie he was going to vote the other way. Now John Miller he [Willie Brown] expected, but these guys were last-minute betrayals.14
On Monday, June 18, in a last-ditch effort to sway the caucus blacks to his side, Willie Brown held a rally on the Capitol steps appealing for outside interests to pressure pro-McCarthy blacks in the caucus.
Two blacks could either grant me the speakership or deny me the speakership... [My losing would cause] irreparable damage... to the black community of California.15
Speaking in Brown’s behalf were Assemblyman Frank Holoman, Berkley Mayor Warren Widener, and San Francisco publisher Carlton Goodlet. In the subsequent “spinning” following the rally, a confident McCarthy predicted victory and called Willie’s tactic for targeting blacks, “obscene.”
Willie said he felt “optimistic” and suggested the possibility of the Republicans casting the deciding votes. After having served for three years in a stellar performance as Ways and Means Chairman, Willie’s most memorable passage from his speech on the Capitol steps included these words,
Willie Brown is abrasive. Willie Brown is arrogant. But there is nobody who can say Willie Brown doesn’t work harder than anyone. You cannot be against Willie Brown on the basis of performance.16
Needless to say, work ethic and performance mattered little where politics were concerned. In the end, Leo McCarthy got Black Caucus support, and Merv Dymally, as the first black in history to be elected lieutenant governor, maintained his preeminence. For him, according to Mr. Mockler, it was “partially pay-back [relating to differences between friends of Jess Unruh and friends of Phil Burton, as detailed in Chapter 7], partially to get some money to run for lieutenant governor, and partially “Who’s the biggest black leader?”17
The Latino Caucus was disproportionately small, relative to the number of Latinos in the state. There were four members: Peter Chacon (D-San Diego); Richard Allatore (D-Los Angeles, Ray Gonzales (D-Los Angeles) and Alex Garcia (D-Los Angeles). Mr. Chacon, who supported Leo McCarthy from the beginning, got the chairmanship of the Urban Development and Housing Committee and a seat on the Ways and Means Committee.
Richard Allatorre who, on the other hand, supported Willie Brown, was merely assigned seats on three committees [Elections, Labor, and Revenue and Taxation]. Three of the four members of the Latino Caucus were persuaded to support to McCarthy: Mr. Chacon, Mr. Garcia and Mr. Gonzales. Richard Alatorre was the sole member of the four member Latino Caucus who supported Willie Brown.
Yet perhaps the most serious and painful factor in the 1974 contest for speakership was Howard Berman’s defection over to Leo McCarthy. Central to the speakership in this defection: with Mr. Berman went no less than five Democratic Caucus members, a significant number, considering Willie Brown lost by four votes. In the same way that Mr. Brown had taken the minority caucuses for granted, he had been certain that freshman assemblyman and very close friend Howard Berman would deliver votes.
The relationship between Mr. Brown and Mr. Berman dated back to the mid-sixties with the California Young Democrats. The two had worked closely together, advancing the liberal causes of the group, causes that included opposition to the war in Viet Nam.
In 1972, when Mr. Berman was involved in a tight race for his assembly seat, Willie Brown had gone down to Los Angeles to lend support. They knew each other; they were friends. Nonetheless, in the Assembly, alliances were not made on the basis of friendship or history. Rather, consistent with politics, deals were struck on a quid pro quo basis: something for something.
Howard Berman had six votes in a caucus numbering fifty-one members—that was worth something. According to the San Francisco Chronicle,
A group of six Democrats who consider themselves “swing” votes met privately to pledge themselves to McCarthy.18
Friendship aside, Berman stood to get something in exchange for delivering those votes— especially if those votes could create a speakership. Willie Brown may have offered something in the way of a vice chairmanship, but Leo McCarthy, knowing how vital a role Mr. Berman’s votes could play, offered a plum, a prize, a fast-track to the top of the Assembly: he promised to name Howard Berman majority leader in exchange for the votes.
Howard Berman was in a position to deliver votes because he was an astute individual, but he was ambitious, a point that Leo McCarthy may not have carefully considered as he bartered for caucus votes. Mr. Berman, along with Congressman Henry Waxman and his brother Michael, would later run an organization called “the Waxman-Berman machine,” which had a potent political influence in southern California and statewide politics during the late 1970s and1980s.
Before coming to the California Assembly, Howard Berman had been a highly-successful labor lawyer, who had the support and financial backing of the Los Angeles Jewish community and strategic political connections. With Mr. Waxman, a California assemblyman in 1974, he and brother Michael would continue to gain political influence, campaigning to elect “their” members to state and national legislatures.
In 1974 however, Howard Berman was only thirty-two and relatively inexperienced at political operating, though not so unskilled that he did not recognize a fast track to the top. Elected in 1972, he was still a freshman who would have to wait years behind more experienced and senior members for a choice chairmanship or a leadership position. Leo McCarthy played on Howard Berman’s ambition and won the speakership, keeping his promise to make Mr. Berman majority leader, not realizing this same ambition would undo his speakership.
The final group of players in the contest for the speakership was the twenty-nine members in the Republican Caucus. In the end, however, they had no impact on the election, as Willie Brown and Leo McCarthy, according to the long-held tradition that the majority party should choose the speaker without help from the minority party, came to an agreement that the winner of the Democratic caucus would take all.
According to some Republicans though, that agreement might not have been reached if Willie Brown had gotten their early support. Willie Brown, in contrast, told me that the Republicans could have played a role, “if they had been smart.” Initially, he did receive support from some members, but, according to Ken Maddy, a member of that 1974 caucus, in the end, Brown and Moretti had approached and dealt with the wrong set of Republicans:
Willie, Moretti, Murphy, myself, Deddeh and Fenton, and one or two other guys who are now deceased or gone, were all part of a Monday night poker game. I think what they [Willie Brown and Bob Moretti] counted on was a group of us Republicans who were all very close friends with them as being locked-in votes for Willie.19
According to Mr. Maddy, Mr. Brown and Mr. Moretti promised that John Briggs would be the chairman of Agriculture Committee and other promises had been made, but that his [Ken Maddy’s] group—moderate Republicans, who should have been Willie Brown’s natural allies—had been slighted, taken for granted, promised nothing. He continued:
For whatever reason, we all sort of took umbrage at the idea that they were taking us for granted... The reality was that Jerry Lewis and I put together the Republicans who jumped ships and moved over to McCarthy, with no promises from McCarthy, basically, only that we would get a fair shot based on ability, that the members of our caucus who were the ones who worked hard would get a shot.20
Frank Murphy, a Republican assemblyman and lobbyist who was Mr. Brown’s vice chairman on the Revenue and Taxation Committee and a member of the Monday night poker game, related a concurring assessment.
I think it was a tactical error on Mr. Brown’s part—the way in which he approached campaigning on this. He turned the task of dealing with Republicans over to two of his lieutenants who botched it, I think, and gave Mr. McCarthy an opportunity to approach Republicans as a group and offer to them—not necessarily concessions, but his personal assurances that their rights would be respected and their talents would be utilized, and I think he just made things more comfortable for Republicans than Mr. Brown did. Not because he and Mr. Brown wouldn’t be able to do the same things I’m sure, but just the way he went about letting Republicans know things21.
With Republican support thus shifted, it was easier for Willie Brown to agree with Leo McCarthy with reference to discounting the Republican Caucus in the speakership vote. Senator Maddy recalled a disparity in perception, remarking,
Moretti, who I was quite close to, and Willie, who I always considered a good friend, were very upset with myself, and Jerry Lewis, and Bob Beverly, and all the guys who moved to McCarthy’s side, for the simple reason that they thought that we were double-crossing them. And our theory was that they had excluded us, they had given away too many favors.22
But it was 1974, a year that the Watergate scandal dominated national politics and Republicans suffered at the November polls.
We lost a substantial numbers of seats. We were reduced down to almost next to nothing... McCarthy came in and greeted us with the news when we got back-- and I was one of the leaders, Lewis and I—Bob Beverly I think was going to become minority leader at that point in time. But in any event, [McCarthy] greeted us that there would be no Republican chairmanships at all.
Willie had promised like five or six to various people, so when we caucused on our first day back, and the question was McCarthy’s speakership, and he’d already put the word out to many of us that, “I’m sorry, but the only way I can consolidate my power among the Democrats is to take everything away from you guys ‘cause you’re down to such low numbers,”—we were down to 23 or so, the lowest number we had since 1898 or something, we had lost so many seats that year.
And like, Ray Sealy got promised to be Chairman of Agriculture. Sealy got beat that year, surprisingly. Anyway, Briggs and others who had been supporters of Willie really did a number on us who had supported Leo, and in caucus, absolutely lambasted us, and said, “This is what you’ve caused, we’ve absolutely zero power now, you know, at least we could have trusted Willie!”
And so our caucus then unanimously turned it around and went back to Willie and said you have our unanimous votes now for speaker. And so Willie ran it up the flagpole and tried to get enough votes in the Democratic caucus, and I guess what they had sworn to do between Leo and Willie was that whoever had the majority of votes in the Democratic caucus, they didn’t come to us and rely upon us, which they could have done.
I’m not sure how it all transpired, but anyway, the long and short of it is that we then unanimously voted for Willie, even those of us who had supported Leo, which then made it easier for Leo to dump all the crap on us for the rest of the year.23
ELEVENTH HOUR
Bearing in mind that Bob Moretti was still speaker through much of the campaigning by Brown and McCarthy in June, he did his best to give friend Willie the best opportunity for the job. While running for Governor earlier in the year, he indicated he would step down as speaker after the primary. After losing to Edmund G. Brown, Jr. on June 4, Moretti was loath to give up the post unless he knew Willie had the votes to assume it. According to the San Francisco Chronicle,
Although McCarthy seems to have the votes for the job, Speaker Bob Moretti, a Brown backer, won’t give it up. And some of McCarthy’s supporters don’t want to oust Moretti, whom they figure already has suffered ego deflation through the loss of the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. So, the postponement will give Moretti time to exit gracefully, while McCarthy hopes to maintain his votes without some switching to Brown.24
And yet, Moretti stalled purposely in order to give Willie the opportunity to win over votes, indicating he “wouldn’t voluntarily step down until he [felt] Brown could win.”25 Finally however, on Thursday, June 13, McCarthy forced Moretti’s hand with an Assembly floor resolution that he [McCarthy] be elected speaker.
After a two-hour meeting, Moretti agreed to resign on a date to be announced within one week, setting the stage for the issue to be decided in the Democrat Caucus on the following Tuesday. Moretti’s decision spelled the end of the speaker’s campaign, which seemed to spell an end for Brown’s political career. Before leaving the two-hour meeting, Willie declared,
“I will survive! I will survive!” and then he burst abruptly from the room before the meeting ended. Brown brushed past newsmen, almost in tears, and flew to San Francisco to attend the graduation of a daughter from Herbert Hoover Junior High School.26
On June 18, 1974, in a ninety-minute closed-door meeting of 48 of the 49 Democrats [John Quimby was absent, doing an eulogy for a friend], McCarthy won the vote for the speakership by a 26-to-22 margin. Later on June 27, in the full Assembly vote for Speaker, he lost by one vote.
In the aftermath, Brown’s friend Moretti cracked a painfully cynical joke. “The black boy can’t count. Willie laughed, but later he [Willie] and his senior aide, Rudy Nothenberg, cried on each other’s shoulders.27
REFLECTION
For all players and observers involved, it is very easy to suggest, upon reflection, what should or should not have been done, but what is interesting about this indelible chapter in California history is the dynamics of it all; the historical context, usurping, ambition, jealousies, betrayals, political operating, and misunderstandings—all the stuff that makes for good theatre. Nonetheless, it was merely a preview for the most expensive and dramatic speakership contest staged in California history that would begin in late 1979. While I’ve taken a few pages to summarize what happened in 1974 and why, there is sufficient data write fifty more.
Historically, it is more important that Willie Brown learned from this best and worst episode in his political career, and indeed he did. He would have years to reflect on this battle in 1974, years to further fashion himself to become the longest-tenured most popular/most villainized speaker in California history. Senator Maddy, recalling the time, finished with this comment:
It was a strange year. Those were strange years, because Willie, I think, rarely has made errors around here in all the years that I’ve known him, tactical errors in terms of his leadership. But that was a major error that first year. I think to some degree he learned from it.28
In the aftermath of it all, Willie’s final line was optimistic, prophetic, and perhaps tinged with a flickering hope.
There will be other days... and other battles... and other arenas.29
Willie – The Man, the Myth and the Era
THE 1980 SPEAKERSHIP BATTLE
This is risky business. It probably won’t work and it will be the most difficult time we will ever endure... Let’s try it!30
- WILLIE BROWN
[to Mike Roos, Maxine Waters, Frank Vicencia, and Elihu Harris shortly before entering the1980 contest for speaker]
By late 1979, Willie Brown had learned his numbers. The “black boy” from Texas could count better than anyone in the California Assembly, and he stunned the Legislature and the State by pulling off one of the greatest upsets in the history of the speakership.
The drama had begun in 1974 when Willie, Ways and Means Chairman and heir apparent to the speakership, had been outmaneuvered and outbidded for members’ votes in the Democrat Caucus by Leo McCarthy, who snatched the top leadership position and punished Willie by stripping him of his chairmanship, drastically reducing his staff and relegating him to a tiny office on the sixth floor of the Capitol – almost within an eyeshot of Ways and Means Committee room.
Speaker McCarthy’s victory happened largely because there had been some late defections prior to the Democrat Caucus vote that Willie Brown could not overcome. Among these defections was that of ambitious young assemblyman Howard Berman, who bartered the six very important Democrat Caucus votes he controlled for Mr. McCarthy’s promise to make him Majority Leader.
As the curtain rose in late1979 for Act II of the saga (see Chapter 15 for the prequel), Howard Berman had been serving in that capacity for five years, and he, along with brother Michael and Assemblyman Henry Waxman, had forged a political machine that had become strong in southern California. Together, they helped elect new members to the Assembly, members who would be loyal to their ends, which eventually included the speakership for Mr. Berman.
After a little over a year in the “Broom Closet,” a name assembly members use for that tiny sixth floor office near the Capitol cafeteria, Willie Brown came to terms with Leo McCarthy and was named Chairman of the Revenue and Taxation Committee. He wasn’t as powerful as he had been while overseeing Ways and Means, but he had put himself in a position to operate.
The Democrats still held the numerical advantage in the Assembly, 50-30, almost outnumbering Republicans two to one. Thus within the Democrat Caucus the magic number was twenty six – any candidate who could secure twenty-six pledges in a vote would be Speaker.
Once again, the stage was set for an exciting drama that would unfold, though unlike the relatively short and covert speakership contest of 1974, 1980’s bitter public leadership struggle lasted for almost a year.
The players were essentially the same: Leo McCarthy, the liberal San Francisco Democrat Speaker; liberal and ambitious Howard Berman, the power broker from Southern California; Willie Brown, the long-shot who was all but ignored until the end; the Black Caucus, with influences from Mervyn Dymally and other black leaders; the Latino Caucus, with pressure coming from labor and Cesar Chavez; and the Republicans who, according to tradition, were supposed to sit the battle out and hope for the best.
SCENE I:
AUDACES FORTUNA JUVA –
FORTUNE FAVORS THE BOLD
Democrat Jerry Brown had been elected Governor in 1974 and again in 1978, but he was clearly not going to seek that office in 1982, as he sought to challenge Jimmy Carter in the national democratic primaries of late 1979. All around the state, political pundits and forecasters speculated about who would replace him.
But just as it had been with Jess Unruh in 1968 and Bob Moretti in 1974, the lure of that white marble-faced office on the ground floor of the Capitol building seemed irresistible to Speaker Leo McCarthy. More than once in public he alluded to making a bid for the job, but then he also suggested he might be considering the U.S. Senate seat that would come up in 1982.
As many assembly members saw it, Speaker McCarthy would soon be on his way up or out, that the speakership was merely a stepping stone for him. To this end, the San Francisco Democrat had begun fund-raising efforts, as either statewide job would require vast amounts of campaign spending.
But 1980 was an election year, and assembly members in tough districts facing well-financed challengers began to worry that Speaker McCarthy was putting his ambition before their concerns. To many, it was the Speaker who, with state party resources and his enormous capacity for raising money, was responsible for preserving their seats and the majority. Seven Democrat seats had been lost in the 1978 election, and it seemed Republicans would make further gains in 1980.
Assembly Majority Leader Howard Berman was in an ideal position to hear and address members’ legitimate concerns about the coming elections as well as to test their attitudes about having a new leader in the house. The fact that he already had a potent political machine in place that raised hundreds of thousands of dollars and was responsible for at least six victories in one election further made him attractive to those who worried about their seats. Counting supporters quietly, Mr. Berman arrived at the magic number: twenty-six. He would have only to challenge his boss to become absolute master over the Assembly.
Nonetheless, a pretext would be necessary before such a challenge could be issued, an incident that would incite passion in the membership and provide a legitimate reason for a change in leadership. Carefully measuring his wary opponent, it wasn’t long before the majority leader from Los Angeles had his opportunity, as alluded to in the February 1981 issue of Los Angeles magazine.
It all came to a head at a December testimonial dinner when honoree McCarthy did the unthinkable. He neglected to introduce the other Assembly members present. Enraged, they turned to Berman and urged him to topple McCarthy immediately, thus beginning the bitter, year-long battle for the speakership.31
Soon after that dinner, possibly on the very next day, as the Democrat Central Committee had held a fund-raiser at the Firehouse Restaurant in Sacramento, on December 9, Howard Berman, confident that he had sufficient backers to support his challenge, phoned Speaker McCarthy and asked him to step down. He added that, as newly-elected speaker, he would appoint Leo McCarthy Majority Leader, which ironically enough, was the same prize Leo had offered him for his cooperation in the1974 speakership contest.
The phone call and a subsequent meeting happened on December 10, 197932, and the challenge drew a quick response from Speaker McCarthy, who refused to yield his high-profile leadership post and redoubled his efforts at pleasing his supporters and satisfying his membership. But the gauntlet had been thrown down, and the major upheaval in the Assembly that would occur in the following months to come was inevitable.
The phone call and meeting were merely the result of and the culmination of fears and frustrations, some genuinely-felt, some inflamed by Mr. Berman, which existed in the Democrat membership. Tensions had run high even in September, before the legislature recessed, as members raised legitimate questions concerning leadership, only to be threatened by the speaker.
Many of the members were in Sacramento in early December for that very reason – to meet on leadership. The appeal by some to Howard Berman – that he should challenge the speaker – reflected the feelings of a substantial portion of the membership. But Howard Berman was not simply doing the will of those who believed in him and wanted a change in leadership – he had wanted the job all along.
SCENE II:
AD FINEM – TO THE END
In the week that followed, after lengthy December meetings that Leo McCarthy had with Howard Berman, a more responsive Speaker McCarthy went to the membership in order to determine the veracity of his former Majority Leader’s (Howard Berman had resigned the post to challenge the speaker) assertion to have had twenty-six locked-in votes.
The claim was tenuous at best, and Mr. McCarthy, making phone calls and speaking with members, began the process of securing pledges from Democrats who would continue to support his speakership. When he had finally procured twenty-six, he proclaimed himself victorious, hoping to quell the coup, and at a press conference at 5:25 p.m., on December 17, with Willie Brown at his side, he released the names of the members who had promised to vote for him.
The reader must bear in mind that these machinations were occurring while the Legislature was on break, with some conversations and promises made largely by phone. Reassured his majority support in the Democrat Caucus, Speaker McCarthy asked Mr. Berman to concede, but the challenge of the west Los Angeles assemblyman could not be dismissed so easily.
Because counting was such a priority, I have made an attempt to reconstruct the actual numbers game, though, in all the time that has passed, and for the fact that both aspirants were perhaps overly-optimistic in order to influence momentum, a name or two might be erroneously listed. According to Leo McCarthy at his press conference convened at the Capitol, his twenty-six pledges came from:
1) Agnos of San Francisco;
2) Alatorre of Los Angeles;
3) Boatwright of Concord;
4) Bosco of Occidental;
5) W. Brown of San Francisco;
6) Calvo of Mountain View;
7) Deddeh of Chula Vista;
8) Fenton of Montebello;
9) Gage of Napa;
10) Greene of Sacramento;
11) Hannigan of Fairfield;
12) Harris of Oakland;
13) Knox of Richmond;
14) Mangers of Huntington Beach;
15) McAllister of San Jose;
16) McCarthy of San Francisco;
17) Mello of Watsonville;
18) Mori of Pleasanton;
19) Papan of Millbrae;
20) Roos of Los Angeles;
21) Tanner of El Monte;
22) Torres of Los Angeles;
23) Vasconcelles of San Jose;
24) Vicencia of Bellflower;
25) M. Waters of Los Angeles; and
26) Wray of Westminster.
Ironically enough, since numbers were the concern, the number six returned. In 1974, Howard Berman had six votes to wager in the Caucus, and those votes shifted from Willie Brown to Leo McCarthy, essentially making McCarthy speaker. In 1979, however, it was Willie Brown who had six votes to wager, among those the pledges of Mike Roos and Elihu Harris, and those six votes made Mr. Berman’s quest for the speakership exceedingly difficult.
Howard Berman’s response to the press conference and call for concession was a challenge to McCarthy’s numbers. He further accused the speaker of playing a con to get pledges from members, suggesting that by claiming to have majority support, McCarthy was attempting to shift momentum and win votes of uncertain and undecided members, who did not want to end up on the losing side of a speakership battle.
While Berman worked behind the scenes, trying to lock in the votes of the undecided, one of his top lieutenants, Richard Robinson of Santa Ana, challenged three of the names on McCarthy’s list. He said:
1) Assembly member Gage, who was campaigning for Governor Brown for the New Hampshire primaries, was uncommitted;
2) Assembly member Deddeh had given a firm commitment to Berman; and
3) Assembly member Wray had been misled about the vote count and was undecided33.
Robinson’s claims, if true, would reduce McCarthy’s number to twenty-three, three votes short of the majority, but the date was December 17. The numbers would mean nothing until January 7, when the legislature reconvened and an official vote could be taken. In the meantime, the game of politics and political operating would assume its highest form, as both speaker and challenger fought the battle in whispers within private quarters and in public outcries as detailed in the media.
Throughout the initial challenge and the days that followed, Howard Berman was invariably portrayed as a power-hungry ingrate who was betraying the very man who had given him his position as Majority Leader.34
In an attempt to influence public opinion to the contrary, Berman submitted to an interview on December 19, in which he stated reasons for his action. He said that at least part of his motivation for the challenge was the feeling of being deceived by McCarthy.
The speaker assured me in July that he was prepared to take certain steps that would facilitate my chances of being speaker when he stepped down. And then within a month, he backed out of those assurances... I felt betrayed. I felt that a game was being played on me.35
Leo McCarthy did not disagree. He admitted that he said he would step down at some time and “leave the speakership available for Howard, because of his position as majority leader” and that he would “indicate to my friends that I have strong, favorable feelings for Howard becoming speaker.” This was not at issue. The issue was timing. Howard Berman wanted to become speaker in 1980, but Leo wanted to play his options to the end, as Howard detailed.
In the last few months, Leo began to tell me that while his current intention is to run for a statewide office in 1982, he plans to reassess his position in ‘81. And he said that if he changed his mind about running, he’d want to continue as speaker in 1983-84... I’m unwilling to accept that.36
Of course, Berman’s claim of such a perceived betrayal was too tenuous a grounds for a change in state democratic leadership, so in the interview, he carefully laid the foundation for undermining McCarthy’s support and extended that perceived sense of betrayal and subsequent indignation to the concerns of Democrat Party.
I was very instrumental in getting him elected speaker... Leo did reward me for my efforts by making me Majority Leader. He was grateful; I was grateful. That’s an alliance. But lately I feel that he’s forgetting my agenda and the Democratic Party’s agenda to serve his own agency. And that’s why I’m left with a sense of being betrayed.37
Having established a link in this betrayal to the state Democratic Party, he could offer specific criticism in a rightfully concerned manner and advance his own cause for becoming speaker.
He cannot have this personal future agenda and still conduct the governance of California as speaker. Leo is too spread out. By concentrating on his own future, he’s lost his effectiveness as speaker, and this is causing a split among some Assembly Democrats... That’s why when we finally had our long meeting, I told him that I should become speaker and he could take the lead on any issues he wanted – that in effect we’d switch roles.38
Finally, in citing his principal reason for the coup, Howard Berman intimated that, in light of recent Democrat losses in elections, the party needed an effective, focused speaker who could keep the Republicans from gaining the majority in coming election, saying, “the way things were going, we’re courting political disaster in 1980 and in the decade beyond, after reapportionment.”39
The suggestion is that he was forced, by concern for the state and the party, to challenge his friend and boss for the greater good. Not that he loved Leo McCarthy any less, but that he loved the Democratic Party more.